Radner R. Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship // Econometrica. 1981. Vol. 49. P. 1127-1148.
Rapoport A., Chammah A., Dwyer J., Gyr J. Three-Person Non-ZeroSum Nonnegotiable Games // Behavioral Science. 1962. Vol. 7. P. 30-58.
Rapoport A., Chammah A. Prisoners Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
Regan D. Utilitarianism and Cooperation. Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Reich W. How the President Can Thwart Terror // New York Times. 1987. No. 19 (February). A31.
Restak R. The Brain: The Last Frontier. N.Y.: Warner, 1979.
Rice O. The Hatfields-and McCoys. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1982.
Riker W., Ordeshook P. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973.
Riker W., Ordeshook P. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting // American Political Science Review. 1968. Vol. 62. P. 25-42.
Riley J. Competitive Signalling // Journal of Economic Theory. 1975. Vol. 10. P. 174-186.
Robins L. Aetiological Implications in Studies of Childhood Histories Relating to Antisocial Personality // Psychopathic Behavior: Approaches to Research / ed. by R. Hare, D. Schalling. Chichester, Eng.: Wiley, 1978.
Roth A. (ed.). Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Roth A., Malouf M., Murnighan J. Sociological versus Strategic Factors in Bargaining // Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1981. Vol. 2. P. 153-177.
Rothschild M., Stiglitz J. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 80. P. 629-649.
Rubin P, Paul Ch. An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk // Economic Inquiry. 1979. Vol. 17. P. 585-596.
Rubin Z. Liking and Loving. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.
Rubinstein A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model // Econometrics 1982. Vol. 50. P.97-110.
Rushton J.Ph. Altruism, Socialization, and Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980.
Schelling Th. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1960.
Schelling Th. Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors // American Economic Review. 1978. Vol. 68. P. 229-230.
Schelling Th. The Intimate Contest for Self-Command // The Public Interest. 1980. Vol. 60. P 94-118.
Scherer K. Methods of Research on Vocal Communications: Paradigms and Parameters // Handbook of Methods in Nonverbal Behavior Research / ed. by K. Scherer, P. Ekman. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Schmalensee R. Entry Deterrence in the Ready to Eat Cereal Industry // Bell Journal of Economics. 1978. Vol. 9. P. 305-327.
Schwartz B. The Battle for Human Nature. N.Y.: Norton, 1986.
Schwartz Sh. Elicitation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behavior: An Experimental Study of Volunteering to Be a Bone Marrow Donor // Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1970. Vol. 15. P. 283-293.
Scitovsky T. The Joyless Economy. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Sears D., Richard L., Tyler T., Allen H. Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting // American Political Science Review. 1980. Vol. 74. P. 670-684.
Sears D., Hensler C., Speer L. Whites Opposition to Busing: Selfinterest or Symbolic Politics // American Political Science Review. 1979. Vol. 73. P. 369-384.
Sears D., Tyler T, Critin Kinder D. Political System Support and Public Responses to the Energy Crisis // American Journal of Political Science. 1978. Vol. 22. P.56-82.
Seidman L. The Return of the Profit Rate to the Wage Equation // Review of Economics and Statistics. 1979. Vol. 61. P. 139-142.
Seligman M., Hager J. Biological Boundaries of Learning. N.Y.: Meredith, 1972.
Selten R. The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior // Decision Theory and Social Ethics / ed. by H. Gottinger, W. Leinfeller. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. P.289-301.
Sen A. Goals, Commitment and Identity // Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 1985. Vol. 1. P. 341-355.
Sen A. Rational Fools // Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1977. Vol. 6. P.317-344.
Shaven S. Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship // Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 10. P. 55-73.
Shubik M. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.
Skinner B.F. The Behavior of Organisms. N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938.
Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. N.Y.: Kelley, 1966 [1759].
Smith A. The Wealth of Nations. N.Y.: Everyman’s Library, 1910 [1776].
Smith V. Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the Provision of Public Goods // Research in Experimental Economics. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1978.
Solnick J., Kannenberg C., Eckerman D., Waller M. An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control in Humans // Learning and Motivation. 1980. Vol. 11. P.61-77.
Sperry R. Consciousness, Personal Identity, and the Divided Brain 11 Neuropsychologia. 1984. Vol. 22. P. 661-673.
Spinoza В. de. Tractatus Theologico Politicus. L.: Trubner, 1868.
Stein K.B., Sarbin T.R., Kulik J.A. Future Time Perspective: Its Relation to the Socialization Process and the Delinquent Role // Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 1968. Vol. 32. P. 257-264.
Stigler G. The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation // American Economic Review. 1946. Vol 36. P. 358-365.
Robert S. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization // Review of Economic Studies. 1955-1956. Vol. 23. P. 165-180.
Sugden R. Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Doesn’t Work // Journal of Public Economics. 1985. Vol. 27. P. 117-124.
Sweeney J. An Experimental Investigation of the Free Rider Problem // Social Science Research. 1973. Vol. 2. P. 277-292.
Taylor M. Anarchy and Cooperation. Chichester, Eng.: Wiley, 1976.
